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So much has been written about the loyalty-security purges of the
late 1940's and 1950's that a new book bears some burden to justify
itself. Indeed, thirty-six pages of David Caute's book are devoted to a
bibliography of published and unpublished works on this period. By
what standard, then, is one to judge Caute's book? First, history as
retelling-even history as anecdotes- about so terrible a time carries
its own worth, provided that it is done with sensitivity, thoroughness
and style. Caute, judged by such a standard, has done fairly well.
Sifting through files and transcripts and examining the shards of shat-
tered lives, he tells compelling stories of the machinery of repression
and of the purge's impact upon old left parties, the civil service, the
labor movement, the professions and the world of arts and letters.
Second, one might judge the book as legal or jurisprudential
history. Caute undertakes to tell us, in broad outline, what the
Supreme Court was and was not doing during this time, and to recount
details from some of the countless administrative hearings and trials
spawned by the purge. At the level of good reporting-the spinning of
stories-he is once again at his best. But he doesn't really help us
understand how the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the fed-
eral courts of appeals alternately aided and checked repression during
that era.
A third criterion is that of social theory. On his own terms, does
Caute really "indicate why the purge occurred when it did, and why it
died away when it did" ?1 His thesis, that the purge was a byproduct of
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1 D. CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR: THE ANTI-COMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN
AND EISENHOWER 539 (1979).
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the post-World War II Pax Americana, "an ideology both idealistic
and imperialistic,''2 is neither set out in great detail nor defended
against plausible alternative views. And his assertion that the purge
came to an end with the advent of "Kennedy liberalism" is simply
stated in the last paragraph without qualification or justification. 3
I take these three vantage points, history as retelling, history as
jurisprudence, and history as social theory, each in turn.
I. ANECDOTES: THE RETELLING OF THE GREAT PURGE
Without question, Caute has performed his research well, and
writes for the most part compellingly, mordantly and even gracefully.
He was not, however, as thorough as he might have been. He also
lapses periodically into a snide, almost mocking tone in speaking of
the victims of the purge. At times his writing falls from grace into cant
or infelicity, and some of these falls have a slapstick character.
I recommend that he write himself a scathing little essay entitled
"The Limits of Imagery" and post it on his library wall. The word
"manure" appears in the book perhaps a dozen times, always as a
metaphor for fertile soil, which is in turn a metaphor for a place where
ideas grow or actions take root. This is eleven, even twelve, times too
many. Consider the following: "It was the Truman Administration that
manured the soil from which the prickly cactus called McCarthy sud-
denly and awkwardly shot up. The manure was called the Attorney
General's list.' "4 As a statement of historical fact, this is questionable.
As a pronouncement on horticulture, it is nonsense: cactus doesn't do
well in manure. Or consider:
Without doubt, McCarthy's objective historical role was a
healthy one. He pumped up the festering sore of the loyalty-
security program and the Attorney General's list into a mon-
strously inflamed boil that, sooner or later, had to be lanced.
He demonstrated that guilt by association may ultimately
incriminate any association. He reminded the establishment,
the "respectable elements" in both major parties, the pro-
2 Id. at 540.
3 Id. at 542.
4 Id. at 28.
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fessional associations, the press, the churches, that liberty is
indivisible and that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce
for the gander.5
Putting goose sauce on an inflamed boil doesn't do the sauce any good.
It probably doesn't help the boil much either. This sort of purple
writing appears when Caute is attempting to weave together his anec-
dotes or to provide a paragraph or two of analysis.
These stylistic quibbles aside, Caute tells his story fairly well.
Here are the posturings and threats of McCarthy, the House Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee. Here are the mindless blatherings of a generation of loyalty
and security board administrators and hearing officers. Here is the
cowardice of intellectuals, professionals, journalists, politicians and
judges of faint heart. Here, too, are the perjurers and informers: those
who, out of avarice or ambition, artlessly wove tapestries of truth and
deceit in the service of inquisitors of every degree.
Here, too, are the ruined lives in the trade unions, universities,
professions, arts and civil service-in short, a generation silenced.
When the 1960's began with the newly militant challenges to racism,
the institutions which ought to and might have responded did so slowly
and fitfully; they had, if only for safety's sake, lost the habit of speak-
ing and acting. When the young found voice to protest the escalation of
the Vietnam War, our government repressed the most vocal among
them and, through a machinery of conscription at once unfair and
unheeding, sent them to their deaths by the thousands. Caute regards
this history of the 1960's as "another story." I disagree, for reasons I
shall discuss later.
However we view the origins and consequences of this dreadful
time, we must confront it, if only to prevent its continuation and
repetition. For this purpose, Caute's book is among the best, although
others recommend themselves as more thoughtful analyses of particu-
lar aspects of the purge. A minimum list of essential readings would
include books by Alvah Bessie, 6 Eleanor Bontecou, 7 Haakon Cheva-
5 Id. at 50.
6 A. BESSIE, INQUISITION IN EDEN (1965).
7 E. BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM (1953).
1980]
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lier,8 John Cogley, 9 Fred Cook,' 0 Frank Donner," Walter Good-
man, 12 Stefan Kanfer, 13 Matles and Higgins,1 4 Stern and Green ' s and
Alexander Richmond. 1 6 Caute's book has the advantage of breadth of
coverage over any of these books taken alone.
Caute's research skills fail him at one critical point, however. The
Freedom of Information Act' 7 and the Federal Privacy Act of 197418
recently have enabled us to learn a great deal about investigators' and
inquisitors' actions during the 1940's and 1950's. Alger Hiss, in his
continuing battle for vindication, has been a major protagonist in seek-
ing FBI and Justice Department records withheld from him and his
counsel before and during his trials. 19 And the families and supporters
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg have unearthed tens of thousands of
pages of material which cast light not only upon the facts of that case
but also upon the investigative and prosecutorial techniques enlisted in
the service of the purge. Dozens of other applicants and plaintiffs, less
well known, also have been exercising their right to obtain government
investigative files. It would have been useful, and one regrets that
Caute made little effort to pursue the matter, to crosscheck this newly
8 H. CHEVALIER, THE MAN WHO WOULD BE GOD (1959); H. CHEVALIER,
OPPENHEIMER: THE STORY OF A FRIENDSHIP (1965).
9 J. COGLEY, REPORT ON BLACKLISTING (1965).
10 E.g., F. COOK, THE FBI NOBODY KNOWS (1964); F. COOK, THE NIGHTMARE
DECADE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY (1971).
11 F. DONNER, THE UN-AMERICANS (1961).
12 W. GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES (1968).
13 S. KANFER, A JOURNAL OF THE PLAGUE YEARS (1973).
14 J. HIGGINS & J. MATLES, THEM AND Us: STRUGGLES OF A RANK-AND-FILE
UNION (1974).
1s H.P. GREEN & P.M. STERN, THE OPPENHEIMER CASE: SECURITY ON TRIAL
(1971) (includes an excellent bibliography and some striking insights into the legal
process).
16 A. RICHMOND, A LONG VIEW FROM THE LEFT: MEMOIRS OF AN AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONARY (1973).
17 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
18 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
19 See IN RE ALGER HISs (E. Tiger ed. 1979) for reprint of Hiss' petition for writ
of error coram nobis and reproduction of dozens of pages of material Hiss' attorneys
obtained under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. For a brief guide to
these acts, see LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION ACT (4th ed. C. Marwick 1978).
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disclosed material against the known historical record of informer
perjury, FBI chicanery and prosecutorial and judicial connivance.
Caute interviewed a great many people for his book, but appears to
have spent no more than three or four weeks doing so. 2 0
Caute's retelling is also flawed by some easy assumptions; their
combined effect is to let off the hook a number of prominent American
liberals of the period, and to accept all too readily the mythology of the
non-Communist American left. He does acknowledge that one princi-
pal ideological prop of the great purge, "the myth of the vital secret,"
was just that-a myth. Contrary to the view violently expressed by
Judge Irving Kaufman in sentencing the Rosenbergs to death, in 1945
the United States did not control the secret of nuclear fission. Every-
body with any sense knew the Russians could build a bomb within five
years after 1945 without any need for an espionage ring in Western
countries. 21 The myth was often put forward as one justification for
the theory of American Communists as a fifth column.
Yet Caute does accept other myths. He freely throws around the
term "Stalinist" in referring to American Communists of the period,
and he permits sarcasm and invective to color his accounts of Commu-
nist Party actions and tactics during the purge. To be sure, there is, in
retrospect, ground for criticism of the behavior of American Commu-
nists in the 1950's. Many of the vagaries in tactics can be explained by
the judicial posture in which the Party found itself. But the fundamen-
tal point is this: The Communist Party of the United States in the years
1945 through 1960 was not like that of the Soviet Union or of China or
of Eastern European countries. It did not possess state power. Its
members were remorselessly driven from the trade union movement,
20 D. CAUTE, supra note 1, at 622.
21 The postwar debates over atomic energy have been thoroughly chronicled in
the literature. See, e.g., 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTSTS (1946, 1948,
1949, 1950, 1952, 1953, 1954). See also W REUBEN, THE ATOM SpY HOAX (1955).
The entire subject was debated by the scientific and military witnesses in the
Oppenheimer security hearing. For example, Dr. K.T. Compton recounted his partici-
pation in discussions with prominent atomic scientists in 1946. They concluded that
the U.S.S.R. could build an atom bomb in as little as five years and that "the
predominant factor was not scientific information . . . but had to do with industrial
capacity...." U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIOIN, HEARING BEFORE THE PERSON-
NEL SECURITY BOARD: IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER 258 (1954)
(hereinafter cited as IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER). See also M.
Tigar, Atomic Science and Social Responsibility (1961) (unpublished paper).
1980]
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the civil service, the professions, the sciences and every influential
area of American life. Their rights to hold jobs, to engage in profes-
sions, or to hold positions of trust in trade unions were systematically
abridged and denied. To be snide about the twists and turns of the
Communist Party and its members during this period is to equate the
writhing of the tortured with the deliberate and calculated cruelty of
the inquisitor. Caute's attitude is at times all too reminiscent of that of
cold war liberal intellectuals who hated McCarthy, then aped his ways.
In attacking such institutions as the Emergency Civil Liberties Com-
mittee or the United Electrical Workers, these liberals claimed "We
are all for civil liberties, but . . ." But we are for the cold war. But
we are willing to use CIA money to help the American Congress for
Cultural Freedom cripple the Emergency Civil Liberties Commit-
tee.22 But one must recognize that members of the Communist Party
have no legitimate place in American economic life. 23
One of the saddest-in an often quite tragic sense-events of the
purge was the utter collapse of American liberal thought on the ques-
tion of democratic rights. There was almost no support for the simple
proposition that the Bill of Rights applied to persons of every political
persuasion. Caute recognizes this collapse in his survey of the editorial
policy of the New York Times. But he himself continually slips into
that unfortunate rhetoric which accepts the major premise of the Times
editorialists: If McCarthy was evil, it was because he and his
informers falsely identified as Communists those who were not.
His acceptance of this premise occassionally leads Caute uncriti-
cally to accept the claims of the purgers. I was surprised, for example,
to read that the case of Judith Coplon was a "demonstrably proven"
case of espionage. 24 Even accepting the government's version of the
22 M. MCAULIFFE, CRISIS ON THE LEFT: COLD WAR POLITICS AND AMERICAN
LIBERALS, 1947-1954 at 115-21 (1978).
23 On the split personality of liberal thought, see id.
24 D. CAUTE, supra note 1, at 61 (referring to Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d
749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); United States v. Coplon,
185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952). One surprising thing
about the jurisprudence of this period is that so little was done in the wake of United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), in which Learned Hand held that, at
the behest of any criminal defendant, the government must account for any illegal
wiretapping it had committed. There does not appear to be any judicial opinion
pursuing that suggestion until the 1960's.
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facts, the documents which Coplon allegedly attempted to pass to a
Soviet agent were not the sort of "national defense" information
which both the espionage statute itself and the unequivocal command
of the first amendment make the sole basis for prosecution of this most
serious offense. 2 5 Indeed, in speaking of J. Edgar Hoover at a later
point, Caute seems to recognize this fact, making the quoted reference
all the more curious: "What he really feared-a fear well justified by
the Judith Coplon trial in 1949-was that the Bureau's investigatory
mentality would be exposed to ridicule and shame by disclosure of its
files." 26
In short, Caute lapses at times into the very cliches used by
liberals to excuse their own faintheartedness during the purge; these
clich6s were born of uncritical acceptance of official myths about "the
red menace." He ought to have heeded more closely his own warning
words: "During the crucial years of the great fear the most influential,
opinion-forming faction of the American intelligentsia largely (but not
wholly) abandoned the critical function that all intellectuals in all
countries ought to sustain toward government agencies and govern-
ment actions." 27 After all, one purpose of the purge was to tame and
to capture the scientific and intellectual community. When the noncon-
formists had been driven from its ranks, the remainder could be wel-
comed into the "think tanks," "research projects," "centers," "insti-
tutes" and other ghettos erected by the military, the intelligence agen-
cies and corporate America.
II. THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PURGE
I do not know if anyone has completely measured the impact of
the purge upon American law. Certainly Caute has not done so. He
does present sketches of the more significant judicial figures of the
period- Chief Justice Fred Vinson, Attorney General and later Asso-
ciate Justice Tom Clark, and Chief Justice Earl Warren. His bibliogra-
phy indicates that he has reviewed a handful of legal briefs, and per-
25 See generally Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941); Edgar & Schmidt,
The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
929 (1973).
26 D. CAUTE, supra note 1, at 115.
27 Id. at 53.
1980]
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haps half a dozen decided cases. Of the several dozen people he
interviewed, the majority appear to be lawyers or law professors. The
second edition of Emerson and Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the
United States, 28 is in his bibliography. It is rather surprising that he did
not consult the third edition of the same work, 29 which contains a more
thorough collection of cases and comments summarizing the most
crucial legal issues of the period he seeks to describe. His treatment of
the cases he does discuss is at times puzzling. He tells us that the
decisions in Yates v. United States,30 Sweezy v. New Hampshire,3I
and Watkins v. United States, 32 handed down by the Supreme Court
on the same day in 1957, were "momentous," but he does not say
why, He also wrongly intimates that after Sweezy, the Court did not
decide a significant first amendment case in favor of freedom of speech
until 1969 in Brandenburg v. Ohio.33 Although Caute ably describes
many important court battles over civil liberties, he makes no effort to
see the legal history of this period as a whole, much less to identify its
origins and legacies. This omission makes the book a great deal less
useful.
An account of shifts in judicial doctrine might also have
explained some of the abrupt and otherwise inexplicable changes in
litigation tactics by the victims of the purge. During the early history
of what came to be called McCarthyism, the courts were concerned
with trials of dissenters and legal challenges to the administrative
apparatus of repression. In the first wave of resistance to the purge, the
basic proposition that knowing and active membership in the Commu-
nist Party deprived one of both due process and first amendment pro-
tection was established. In Dennis v. United States, 34 the Supreme
28 T. EMERSON & P. HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES (2d ed. 1958).
29 T. EMERSON, P. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1967). This work is the best of its kind. Major cases are set out
with minimal editing; bibliographical and research data is copious. Yet, the work is not
a paste job; the editors' own insights and analysis set the tone.
30 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
31 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
32 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
33 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
34 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1950)(majority opinion by L. Hand, J.). For a thorough discussion of the first amend-
ment issues under consideration here, see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
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Court accepted the set of myths which the government had thrown up
as a justification for the Smith Act prosecution of the Communist
leaders, and affirmed all the convictions. In American Communica-
tions Association v. Douds,35 the Court's majority sustained the con-
stitutionality of section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 36 which required
non-Communist affidavits from union leaders as a condition of
certification and access to the National Labor Relations Board. The
significance of Douds cannot be overemphasized. In 1935, the Wagner
Act recognized unions' rights to bargain collectively, strike, and gov-
ern themselves, and created the National Labor Relations Board to
oversee collective bargaining and insure labor peace. 37 Section 9(h) of
the Taft-Hartley Act repudiated both the right of Communist Party
members to hold union office and the right of union members to elect
leaders of their choice. The statute did not do so explicitly; it merely
made the noncomplying union ineligible for access to the collective
bargaining system established by the Wagner Act. Of course, no union
could survive without such access. 38 Douds is also remarkable for the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, which represented a whole-
sale and largely uncritical capitulation to the prevailing hysteria. 39 In
other cases, the fundamental tenets of the civil service loyalty-
security programs were upheld.40
EXPRESSION (1970). The peregrinations of the law from Dennis to Brandenburg are
chronicled in Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the
Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (1970). "Clear and present danger,"
the touchstone of the decision in Dennis, is a chameleon word. It sent Dennis and his
co-petitioners to jail, came back in a vigorous pro-free speech formulation in Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), and appeared again in Brandenburg. For a trenchant
criticism of the "clear and present danger" formulation, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
Is 339 U.S. 382 (1950)(holding that under the commerce power Congress could
reasonably find that, if allowed to hold union leadership positions, Communists would
represent a continuing danger of disruptive political strikes because they advocate the
overthrow of the government).
36 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 146
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§141, 159(h))(repealed 1959).
37 Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1976)).
38 See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 32-35, 164-68.
39 339 U.S. at 422.
40 See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 205-46.
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After these defeats, lawyers and dissenters learned that if victo-
ries were to be won, they would be won on narrower grounds; the
vindications of civil liberties in the late 1950's and early 1960's are
monuments to the ingenuity of lawyers and judges alike.
In Vitarelli v. Seaton4I and Service v. Dulles,42 the Court
established that an agency must follow its own rules. In Kent v.
Dulles,43 the Court determined that Congress had not intended to
bestow upon the Secretary of State the power to withhold passports. In
Yellin v. United States, 44 the Court invalidated a conviction because
the House Committee on Un-American Activities had violated its
Committee Rules in questioning the petitioner. Quinn v. United
States45 and Emspak v. United States46 dealt with technical questions
concerning the degree of specificity required for a witness to invoke a
constitutional privilege. In Russell v. United States, 47 the Court found
that, although the petitioner was obligated to answer any question
pertinent to the subject under congressional inquiry, such pertinence
could not be established because the House Committee on Un-
American Activities had failed to state clearly the subject under
inquiry. In Greene v. McElroy,48 the Court, while bestowing great
praise upon the right of cross-examination, held in petitioner's favor on
the narrow ground that Congress had not specifically authorized the
investigating agency to deprive him of this right.
I do not intend to demean either these decisions or the judges who
wrote them. The decisions were narrower than they might have been
because the fundamental battle had already been lost. And, for the
petitioners and those like them, these decisions undoubtedly mitigated
the awful impact of the purge. By deciding cases in favor of freedom
on narrow grounds, the fragile majority of the Warren Court managed
41 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
42 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
43 357 U.S. 116(1958).
44 374 U.S. 109 (1963). See also Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84
(1949).
45 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
46 349 U.S. 190 (1955). See also Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
47 369 U.S. 749 (1962). See also United States v. Lamont, 236 F2d 312 (2d Cir.
1956).
48 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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to avoid the flights of freedom-destroying rhetoric that had character-
ized the decisions of the Vinson Court.
But there is a great difference between a forthright declaration
that the Constitution forbids government interference with personal
beliefs and a relatively narrow, post hoc determination that some pro-
cedural requirement has not been met. The former kind of decision
tells the administrator, the prosecutor, the legislator or the lower court
judges: This far and no farther. The latter kind of decision, because of
the nature of the bureaucratic process to which it is addressed, trickles
down slowly and affects the action of lower-level officials feebly,
belatedly and sometimes not at all. This phenomenon has been com-
mented upon by others, 49 and helps to explain the continued savagery
of the purge after a series of seemingly significant reversals in the
courts.
Early in the purge the Court upheld the right of any witness
before a congressional committee to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination.5 0 This right, however, was qualified by the recognition
that the fifth amendment privilege could be waived unintentionally by
the unwary witness,51 and that the privilege did not attach to an
organizations's records and documents. 52 Moreover, recognition of the
privilege against self-incrimination did not dispel the stigma that
attached to all who invoked it.
In his truncated consideration of Yates, Sweezy and Watkins,
Caute claims that these were significant decisions, and he seems to
recognize that the promise they appeared to contain was not fulfilled.
His failure to press the analysis further is a disappointment. Yates
reversed the convictions of the "second string" Communist Party
Smith Act defendants. It seemed to set standards for "political" prose-
cutions that could rarely if ever be met, and it was popularly assumed
that no conviction of Communist Party members could again survive a
first amendment challenge. In fact, the decision was somewhat nar-
"' See, e.g., Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration,
54 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1966).
51 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955).
51 Id. at 164-65.
52 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1957)(citing United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944)); Meltzer, Required Records, the McCar-
ran Act and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. CmI. L. REV. 687 (1951).
1980)
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rower, focusing upon the requirement of specific intent and the distinc-
tion between advocacy and imminently threatening activity. 53
Watkins, 54 which reversed the conviction of a labor leader who
refused to answer a congressional committee's questions, was full of
language suggesting that the Court might consider the legitimacy of
the Committee on Un-American Activities. Borrowing phrases from
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English dissenters' refusals to
answer, and asking the pointed question, "Who can define the meaning
of 'un-American'?', 55 the opinion by Chief Justice Warren marched on
in measured cadence. His words were all the more welcome because
by this time the Committee, and its stepbrother the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, frequently entered communities at the behest
of local reactionary politicians in order to pillory members of various
professions and trade unions-a practice which Caute ably docu-
ments. But the question actually decided in Watkins rested upon an
analysis of the statutory language "pertinent to the subject matter
under inquiry" 56 and thus was narrower than the Chief Justice's rheto-
ric suggested. 57
Sweezy v. New Hampshire58 rested upon constitutional principle.
While employed as a visiting professor at the University of New
Hampshire, Sweezy, a Marxist economist of international renown,
refused to answer the state attorney general's questions. The plurality
opinion upholding his refusal stressed the first amendment values
inherent in the concept of academic freedom. It must be recalled,
however, that the questions Sweezy refused to answer dealt principally
with matters other than Communist Party membership, such as the
contents of a lecture Sweezy delivered and any knowledge Sweezy had
of the New Hampshire Progressive Party and its members.5 9 Having
53 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312-27 (1957)(holding that the Smith
Act does not prohibit advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow of the United States
government when such advocacy and teaching is divorced from any effort to instigate
specific action toward that end). There was a flurry of post-Yates activity which lent
support to the broader view of the effect of Yates. See 1 T. EMERSON & D. HABER,
supra note 28, at 390-92.
54 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
5 Id. at 202.
56 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1976).
57 354 U.S. at 208-15.
58 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
59 Id. at 243-44.
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already decided in Pennsylvania v. Nelson6" that most state sedition
statutes were preempted by federal legislation, the Sweezy Court's
decision stressed that the inquiry had been conducted by a state
agency.61
The hopes raised by Yates, Watkins, and Sweezy were soon
dashed. Lloyd Barenblatt, 62 Carl Braden63 and Frank Wilkinson 64
had the temerity to believe that the first amendment would protect them
against the inquisitors. They all went to jail, their convictions narrowly
sustained by the Supreme Court. In June of 1961, the Court upheld a
registration order against the Communist Party,65 and affirmed Junius
Scales' conviction under the Smith Act membership clause. 66 It was
not simply that the Court refused to overturn earlier decisions placing
the Communist Party beyond the reach of first amendment and due
process protection-that was an occasion for regret, though perhaps
not surprise. In the registration case, the wonder was that so broadly
freedom-destroying a system of regulation could ever pass constitu-
tional muster. And in both cases, the Court turned an uncritical eye to
the purchased testimony upon which the determinations under review
rested. 67
This is not to imply agreement with Caute's belief that the first
amendment showed a flicker of life on a day in 1957, had a stake
driven through its heart on another day in 1961, and only revived
somewhat later in 1969. Before and even after the decisions of June
1961, there were sporadic first amendment victories. The same Court
which systematically turned aside leftist challenges to political repres-
sion systematically sustained such attacks on behalf of black organiza-
tions. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee68 and
60 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
61 354 U.S. at 235.
62 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). See generally Bendich,
First Amendment Standards for Congressional Investigation, 51 CAL. L. REV. 311
(1963).
63 Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
64 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
65 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
66 Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); cf. Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961)(reversing a similar conviction).
67 But see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115
(1956) (concerning government informers).
68 372 U.S. 539 (1963). See T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 267.
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Bates v. City of Little Rock, 69 the Court upheld the right to join
organizations working to vindicate the promises of the fourteenth
amendment. In the NAACP cases, 70 the Court struck down legisla-
tion and judicial action similar in intent and even in methodology to the
registration and other restrictive provisions of the Internal Security Act
of 1950. The Court could not put blacks and black organizations
outside the pale of first amendment protection, as it had Communists.
A speaker whose message was neither red nor black, such as the
sheriff in Wood v. Georgia, 71 might also expect charitable consider-
ation of his first amendment claim. And, five years before Branden-
burg v. Ohio 72-which invalidated a state syndicalism statute-the
Court struck down on constitutional grounds the restriction on Com-
munists holding passports. 73 In 1967, the Court held in United States
v. Robe174 that the general prohibition on Communists working in
defense plants violated the first amendment.
Caute has barely sketched this constitutional history of the purge.
He has sought neither to understand that history nor to draw its essen-
tial lessons.
It is not surprising that the first amendment should have proved so
fragile in the face of adversity. It has traditionally been so. 75 No act of
Congress was struck down on first amendment grounds until the
1960'S.76 The Alien and Sedition Acts were not invalidated by judicial
decree, but were undone by Congress itself. The Court on which
Holmes and Brandeis sat affirmed several World War I convictions that
69 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
70 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293
(1961). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)(the first of a line of cases in
which the Court invalidated every state loyalty oath it considered).
71 370 U.S. 375 (1962)(holding that a county sheriff's first amendment right to
criticize as politically motivated a judge's impanelling of a grand jury to investigate
bloc voting by blacks outweighs any interference with the fair administration of justice
such criticism might cause).
72 395 U.S. 444(1969).
73 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
74 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
75 See generally Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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were challenged on first amendment grounds. 77 No court dared inter-
fere with the mass deportation of alien Communists in the wake of
World War 178 nor with the conviction in Whitney v. California79
under a criminal syndicalism act. There were victories in the courts for
the left during the period between the wars, but these were mostly jury
trials, as readers of any good work on Clarence Darrow will recall*80
Change a few details, names and dates, and Zechariah Chafee's
description of the purge during and after World War I is an accurate
portrayal of the period of which Caute writes:
[T]ens of thousands among those "forward-looking men and
women" to whom President Wilson had appealed in earlier
years were bewildered and depressed and silenced by the
negation of freedom in the twenty-year sentences requested
by his legal subordinates from complacent judges. So we had
plenty of patriotism and very little criticism, except of the
slowness of munition production. Wrong courses were fol-
lowed like the despatch of troops to Archangel in 1918,
which fatally alienated Russia from Wilson's aims for a
peaceful Europe. Harmful facts like the secret treaties were
concealed while they could have been cured, only to bob up
later and wreck everything. What was equally disastrous,
right positions, like our support of the League of Nations
before the armistice, were taken unthinkingly merely
because the President favored them; then they collapsed as
soon as the excitement was over, because they had no depth
and had never been hardened by the hammerblows of open
discussion. And so when we attained military victory, we
did not know what to do with it. No well-informed public
opinion existed to carry through Wilson's war aims for a new
world order to render impossible the recurrence of disaster. 81
77 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919).
78 See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
79 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
80 E.g., ATTORNEY FOR THE DAMNED (A. Weinberg ed. 1957); C. DARROW,
THE STORY OF My LIFE (1932). K. TIERNEY, DARROW: A BIOGRAPHY (1979), does
not contribute much beyond what had already been written. See W. HAYWOOD, BILL
HAYWOOD'S BOOK (1929)(a good firsthand account); R. GINGER, BENDING CROSS: A
BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEBS (1949).
8' Z. CHAFEE, supra note 75, at 561-62.
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The legal history of the "great fear" ran a course charted in
earlier decades. Had Caute taken notice of this, he might have been led
to doubt his historical judgment that the "great fear" arose suddenly
after World War II and completely ran its course by the time of John
Kennedy's inauguration as President.
III. THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE PURGE
As a social and political historian, Caute exhibits the same weak-
ness he exhibits as a legal historian: an insular approach which deals
primarily with the immediate years of the purge and therefore fails to
consider that the most important causes of the purge may lie in the year
before World War II. Just as the behavior of our courts during the
McCarthy Era can be traced to their behavior in the early years of this
century, so the political and social attitudes prevalent during the purge
have roots deep in American history. There is not room in a brief
review to present a complete alternative to Caute's view, but there is
room to suggest that the main political and social attitudes of the
purge- anti-unionism, global thinking characterized by imperialism
and intervention, hypersensitivity to "national security," and animos-
ity towards Russia- existed long before the post-war Pax Americana.
It is true that the United States did not achieve its position as the
world's most powerful imperialist nation until after World War II. But
this did not happen suddenly or by accident, as the most cursory
consideration of American history shows. The Monroe Doctrine,
American relations with Cuba after the Spanish-American War and
American interventions in Mexico and other Latin American nations
are all extensively documented historical facts which demonstrate that
the United States had global interests of an economic and strategic
nature long before World War 11.82 The Pax Americana was not the
legacy of a single war, but the culmination of a long process.
It would also be a mistake to assume that red-baiting attacks on
the trade union movement began, or even reached new heights, after
82 For a general source regarding relations between Cuba and the United States,
as well as a treatment of United States policy toward Latin America, see W.A.
WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1961); WA. WILLIAMS, THE
TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1959). Williams' books also deal with the
imperialist expansion thesis.
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World War 11.83 Beginning at the turn of the century, employers,
legislatures and federal and state prosecutors sought not only to crush
the labor movement as a whole, but also to divide and weaken it by
attacking its most left-wing elements. One has but to review the his-
tory of the prosecutions of the leaders of the International Workers of
the World to see that singling out radical members of the labor move-
ment was nothing new. 84
Nor did anti-Soviet animosity suddenly materialize after World
War II. During the war, the ground was being prepared for postwar
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The seriousness of these prepara-
tions cannot be overstated, and they were accompanied by a studied
effort to sabotage the institutions of collective security that were to be
embodied in the United Nations Charter. When these efforts reached
fruition after the War, among the principal victims of the purge were
those who had played an important role in bringing the charter into
being and in continuing the Roosevelt foreign policy. Also purged
were those involved in reporting accurately on the corruption and
weaknesses of the Chiang Kai-Shek government in China. 8s
The development and use of the atomic bomb provides a forceful,
chilling instance of careful preparation for postwar animosity towards
the Soviet Union. The Manhattan Project, created on August 16, 1942
as a part of the Army Corps of Engineers, was charged with the
responsibility of developing a nuclear weapon; General Leslie R.
Groves was appointed to head it on September 17 of that year. Years
later, General Groves testified:
I think it is important to state-I think it is well known-
that there was never from about two weeks from the time I
took charge of this project any illusion on my part but that
Russia was our enemy and the project was conducted on that
83 For discussions of the red-baiting attacks on the trade union movement at the
turn of the century see W. HAYWOOD, supra note 80; R. GINGER, EUGENE V. DEBS:
A BIOGRAPHY (1962); P. FONER, IV HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (1965).
4See W. HAYWOOD, supra note 80.
85 See generally O.E. CLUBB, THE WITNESS AND 1 (1975); F. COOK, THE FBI
NOBODY KNOWS, supra note 10; F. COOK, THE NIGHTMARE DECADE, supra note 10;
Interview with Alger Hiss (November 28, 1979).
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basis. I didn't go along with the attitude of the country as a
whole that Russia was a gallant ally.86
This attitude was not uniquely General Groves'; it permeated the
entire undertaking. Many scientists on the project put aside their reser-
vations about building so terrible a weapon only because they believed
that Nazi Germany also possessed the capability to make one. The
scientists were not told that in the late spring and summer of 1945,
immediately following the surrender of Germany, the Japanese were
making surrender overtures, rendering the need to use the weapon
against Japan questionable at best. There is a great deal of evidence
that the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was part of an
effort to keep the Soviet Union from participating in a settlement in the
Pacific theatre. Under the Potsdam Agreement, Stalin had agreed to
enter the war against Japan within three months after the surrender of
Germany. In fact, by early August Soviet troops had rolled through
most of Manchuria. The scientists were told merely that the bomb had
to be ready three months after Germany's surrender.87 Atomic scientist
Philip Morrison, reviewing P.M.S. Blackett's book, The Military and
Political Consequences of Atomic Energy, 88 wrote: "I can testify per-
sonally that a date near August 10th was a mysterious final date which
we, who had the daily technical job of readying the bomb, had to meet
at whatever cost in risk or money or good development policy." 8 9
To place the purge in context, then, one must study its antece-
dents in the carefully laid plans to undermine a postwar collective
security system. Caute does not do so. He pays scant attention to the
postwar development of those American policies whose critics the
purge silenced. At the United Nations, for example, the United States
86 IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, supra note 21, at 173. See
generally H. GREEN & P STERN, supra note 15.
87 IN THE MATTER OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, supra note 21, at 170, 260,
274. See generally P.M. BLACKETT, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
or ATOMIC ENERGY (1948); W. LAURENCE, DAwN OVER ZERO: THE STORY OF THE
ATOMIC BOMB (1946); Stimson, The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, HARPER'S,
Feb. 1947, at 97.
88 P.M. BLACKETT, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ATOMIC
ENERGY (1948).
89 5 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 40 (1949).
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proposed the Baruch Plan, which would have given this country a
virtual monopoly in nuclear development. In derogation of the United
Nations Charter, the United States formed a series of regional military
alliances, drawing the nations of Western Europe into the policy of
ringing the Soviet Union with military power.90
Where the iron ring around the socialist camp threatened to
weaken or break, covert action alternated with overt force. The CIA
intervened in Greece and Italy, and later in Guatemala. American
intervention in Indochina was already beginning in the 1950's; by
1953, the United States was paying eighty percent of France's cost of
waging that war.91
The main features of the purge- anti-unionism, anti-
Communism, a keen awareness of American global interests whose
protection required intervention and other global strategies-can thus
be discovered in a quick survey of pre-World War II American history.
The purge had deep roots; in focusing on the "ideology both idealistic
and imperialistic" of the Pax Americana as the cause of the purge,
Caute ignores the fact that the "idealistic and imperialistic" ideology
was itself much older than he suggests.
Caute finishes his book as follows:
When Kennedy took office there was both a joyous
confirmation of the new liberalism and, in certain quarters, a
sharp reaction, a paranoid scare campaign. Despite the Birch
Society and other vigilante groups of the New Right, and
despite Goldwater's success in capturing the Republican par-
ty, the liberal establishment easily disposed of the challenge
until the Vietnam War and the rise of the militant New Left
completely changed the face of the political landscape. But
that is another story.92
"That," whatever its syntactical antecedent, is not another story. The
maintenance of the American empire was a continuous process, which
90 See generally J.P. MORRAY, FROM YALTA TO DISARMAMENT: COLD WAR
DEBATE (1961); K. ZILLIACUS, I CHOOSE PEACE (1950).
91 For a general discussion of the history and actions of the CIA, see W. COR-
SON, THE ARMIES OF IGNORANCE (1977). The background to American involvement
in Vietnam is told in E. HAMMER, THE STRUGGLE FOR INDOCHINA (1955); Roberts,
The Day We Didn't Go to War, THE REPORTER, Sept. 14, 1954, at 31.
97 D. CAUTE, supra note 1, at 541-42.
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did not significantly abate with the passing of John Foster Dulles from
the political scene. The revolts and uprisings of the 1960's bear a
distinct relationship to the repression and resulting silence of the
1940's and 1950's. The purge silenced voices which otherwise would
have spoken about controlling the actions of the state at home and
abroad, and about racism, poverty and unemployment. When we
emerged from the 1950's, no significant popular check had been placed
upon American foreign policy for a decade, and no serious popular
attention had been devoted to those problems which became the rally-
ing cries for the movements of the 1960's. And when those voices
were raised, the old weapons of the purge were trotted out again.
Indeed, the tools of repression forged during the McCarthy period,
newly sharpened and accompanied by those newly forged, are still in
use. The concept of "national security," for example, has cropped up
again and again in the last decade, and always as an excuse for limiting
access to what the government knows, or for punishing those critical
of what the government does.
The liberal establishment which existed at the time John F.
Kennedy became President was an establishment cleansed of its leftist
elements by the purge. It was an establishment staffed by those com-
mitted to the policies of intervention and confrontation with the Soviet
Union which had begun after World War II and have continued through
the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Carter administrations.
More importantly, to say that "that is another story" is to make a
mistake not simply about the United States in the postwar world, but
about the writing of history in general. The study of history should not
be simply a sharply bounded photograph of the past, no matter how
valuable-and this book is valuable-such a photograph may be.
History is useful because it is a mirror to the present and because in
telling us what happened then, it helps us understand where we are
now and where we are going.
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